

NBC BRIEFING

19 June 1957

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**ON REPORT ON HUNGARY**

- I. The report of the UN Special Committee on the Problem of Hungary has been completed and approved without reservations by all members of the Committee (Australia, Ceylon, Denmark, Tunisia and Uruguay). It will probably be submitted to regular session of the General Assembly this fall (an earlier special session appears unlikely).
  - A. The report strongly condemns the USSR for its intervention, and brands as false the Soviet thesis that the uprising was fomented by reactionary circles in Hungary abetted by western "imperialists."
  - B. It concludes that the revolt was a spontaneous national uprising due to long standing popular grievances - one of which was the inferior status of Hungary with respect to the USSR.
- II. The report cites numerous examples of Soviet duplicity.
  - A. It absolves Premier Nagy of any complicity in the initial intervention of Soviet forces and notes that the first Soviet tanks appeared in Budapest at 2 am on 24 October.
    1. The Soviet Government claims it intervened on the basis of a telegram received on 24 October from the Hungarian premier requesting Soviet assistance to quell the uprising.

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B. The report states: "It is indeed difficult for the committee to understand how Soviet tanks could arrive in Budapest at 2 am 24 October in response to a request received by the Government of the USSR on the same day."

B. The report also questions the validity of the Soviet claim that it reintervened in Hungary on 4 November on the invitation of the Kadar government.

1. The Committee states that it "is satisfied that no well-placed observer could conclude that the Nagy Government "was in any serious danger from counter-revolutionary forces."
2. Report calls attention to the notable absence of the new Kadar Government at the time of the second intervention.
3. Committee has evidence that Kadar who disappeared from Budapest after 2 November, was in Moscow on 4 November (his radio speech from Smolnok outside Budapest on that morning being a tape recording) in Prague on 5 and possibly 6 November, and not in Budapest until the morning of 7 November.

C. The committee concludes: "The Soviet withdrawal during the last days of October was no more than a measure dictated by the desire of the Soviet army to be in a position to launch a more powerful intervention with the least possible delay."

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1. In this connection the Committee has testimony that in the negotiations on 3 November between the Hungarian and the Soviet military officials for withdrawal of Soviet forces, discussions proceeded smoothly and amicably until almost midnight.
2. At that point the delegations were interrupted by the entrance of Soviet security chief General Serov and other officers who announced that they were arresting the Hungarian delegation.
3. General Malinin, head of Soviet delegation, visibly astonished, made a gesture of indignation. Serov whispered to him; Malinin then shrugged his shoulders and ordered his delegation to leave the room.

III. Finally the committee notes that the Soviet action in Hungary "would probably be open to condemnation under the Soviet government's own definition of aggression."

- A. Soviet proposal to UN in 1956 provided that the "attacks or indirect aggression may not be justified by the internal situation of any state, as for example...any revolutionary or counter-revolutionary movement, civil war, disorders or strikes..."

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IV. Other highlights:

XIII. A. Report notes Soviet intervention to arrest Nagy after Kadar para 35-40 gov't had given Yugoslav guarantee of his safety if he left asylum in Yugoslav Embassy.

VI. B. Two witnesses said that on 25 Oct Gero asked Nagy to sign para 49 an antedated document asking Soviet intervention and that Nagy wrote on the paper "I do not accept this. I will not sign it."

VII. C. "Committee knows of no Hungarian" who acted to repress para 26 insurrection following Soviet re-intervention on 4 November.  
"If any Hungarians fought against the insurgents, they were only the few members of the dissolved AVH...."

XV. D. Committee concludes that "deportations of Hungarian citizens para 28 to the USSR have taken place in considerable numbers, which cannot be accurately assessed, but which run into the thousands." No proof that more than part have been returned to Hungary.

X. E. Report notes that on night of 23 Oct AVH "infuriated the para 36 demonstrators by use of Red Cross ambulances. Vehicles "contained AVH police waving doctors' white coats" and carried arms.

II. F. "Many of the new Soviet troops brought into Hungary for the para 28 second intervention came from the distant regions of Central Asia. Many believed they were in Egypt, with the mission of fighting the Anglo-French "Imperialists".